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Yost: State Versus Federal Jurisdiction and Control over Admission and

State Versus Federal Jurisdiction and Control Over
Admission and Discipline of Attorneys
Courts are generally in agreement that the "right to practice
law is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."' Due process of law, equal protection
of the laws, first amendment freedoms and other federal constitutional guaranties may be invoked in attorney admission and discipline procedures. Within the last five years, the Supreme Court of
the United States has wrestled with several fundamental issues of
vital interest to the legal profession. An examination of the issues
and the decisions thereon merits our immediate attention.
A "dangerous procedent" is the way one writer2 describes
the 1957 decision of the Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar
of California.' The Court's decision in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners of State of New Mexico," rendered on the same day,
prompted a critique5 that an erosion of the loyalty standards of bar
associations had taken place. Other writers6 expressed dissatisfaction with either the substantive reasoning or the political and sociological effects contemplated to follow.
The holdings in these two cases are simple enough. In Konigsberg, the Court held: (1) that the applicant in refusing to answer
questions concerning his political opinions or associations, including
membership in the Communist party, did not justify inference of
bad moral character; and (2) that the state may not arbitrarily
exercise power in bar membership selection in a manner infringing
on freedom of political expression or association. In Schware, the
Court held: (1) that the bar applicant's past membership in the
Communist party, his prior use of aliases and his arrest record could
not be said to raise substantial doubts about his present good moral
character; and (2) that it would deprive him of constitutional due
process to deny him the right to qualify for the practice of law.

West Virginia State Bat v. Early, 144 W. Va. 504, 517, 109 S.E.2d
420 (1959).
2 Comment, 36 N.C.L. REv. 186, 189 (1958).
3 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
4 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
5 Comment, 106 U. PA. L. R.v. 753 (1958).
6 Comment, 71 Hxv. L. Rav. 154 (1957); Comment, 3 VnL. L. Rv. 93
(1958); Comment, 60,W. VA. L. RFv. 81 (1958).
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What in these opinions causes so much concern? Did the Supreme Court encroach on the traditional domain of the several states
in limiting their jurisdiction and control over their respective bars?'
A brief historical summary of the legal profession will serve to
show how it has traditionally imposed self-restrictions and controls
on its members. This should aid in understanding why a state, and
more particularly the state judiciary, considers the regulation of
the bar to be a state function and why the Konigsberg and Schware
decisions created such concern. However, in light of four recent
Supreme Court decisions, Cohen v. Hurley,' In re Anastaplo,9
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California'" and Lathrop v. Donohue,"
it will become obvious that the more recent trend of the Court is
to respect the states' dignities and to stop interfering with their local
responsibilities.
During medieval England, the Inns of Court, judges and Parliament supervised the activities of the barristers and attorneys.' 2
By the end of the middle ages, the English lawyers had become a
well organized profession. 3 Although American colonization was
not receptive nor conducive to a highly organized legal profession,"4
it was learned through bitter experience during the young country's
development that professional organization was the only means of
survival from decadence.' 5
Now as during the medieval period, most of the responsibility
for supervising the profession rests upon the courts. Of course,
state legislatures may contribute their views as to how thoy believe
the state bars should be managed, but this is allowed more or less
in a sense of acquiescence by the courts out of a desire for harmony' 6
since there is generally recognized to be an inherent power in the
courts to supervise the practice of law.' 7 The reason why, in addition to revered tradition, is because an attorney is an officer of the
7

Bradwell v. The, State, 16 Wall. 130 .(1872)...
U.S. 117.(1961).
1366 U.S. 82 (1961),
10 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
8 366

.

.

" 81 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1961).
,2PoUND, Tr LAWYER FROM ANTIQUTrY TO MODERN Tims 100 (1953).
3
1Id.at 93.
14 Id. at 109.
'5

Id. at XXVIII.

J.B.A. Kan. 362 (1956).
, Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179
AUt. 139 (1935); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn.
1624

7

Supp. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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court,' 8 and under the doctrine of separation of powers, the judicial
branch is sovereign over its own affairs. 9
But regardless of the problem of which branch of government
may exercise control over the state bar, the point sought to be made
is that the control of admissions and discipline of the state bar is
primarily local in nature and, therefore, fundamentally a state function." The states have always taken pride in their autonomy in
this sphere. The police power of the states is not a grant from
the Constitution of the United States2 ' but is subject to and limited
by that document. 2 The Supreme Court was early cognizant of
these facts and has given recognition thereto on numerous occasions."
However, before the fourteenth amendment was welded and
fused into the Constitution in 1868, no general limitation circumscribed the powers of the states, since the Bill of Rights was generally considered to be a restriction upon the national government
and not applicable to the states.2" Not until after World War I did
the fourteenth amendment become really significant in protecting
individual liberties from state action. Tradition and reason, therefore, largely explain the present position of the states that they have
primary control and jurisdiction over their bars.
That was the situation before the 1957 Konigsberg26 and
Schware" cases. In fact, only a few years before, the Supreme
Court had strengthened the states' beliefs that they were masters
18 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333 (1886); Emanuel v. Cooper, 153 Iowa 572, 133 N.W.1064 (1912); See

generally TRUMBULL, MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY 62-85 (1957).
9

" State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. Supp.
222, 20140 A.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
Bradweil v. The State, 16 Wall. 130 (1872); See generally TRumBULL,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 62-85.
21 Armour & Co. v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 178, 67 S.E. 417 (1910).
22
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
2
3E.g., In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 570 (1944): "The responsibility
for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests with Illinois." An order of the
highest court of a state which disbars a member cannot be re-examined
and reversed by the Supreme Court acting in the capacity of a court of review.
Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917). The power of a state to prescribe
the qualifications for admission to its own bar is unaffected by the fourteenth
amendment, and -the Supreme Court cannot inquire into the reasonableness
or propriety of the rules that the state may prescribe. Bradwell v. The State,
16 Wall.
130 (1872).
24
2 5 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
DowLia, CoNsnrrunoNAL LAw 599 (6th ed. 1959).
26
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
27
Sehware v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico, 353
U.S. 232 (1957).
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over their respective bars when the Court held that the choice as
to the personnel of its bar rests with the state." But the general
disinclination on the part of the Supreme Court to consider claims
arising under the fourteenth amendment in state bar admission proceedings vanished with its rulings in the 1957 Konigsberg and Schware
decisions.29 In these cases, for the first time, the Court reviewed a
state's application of bar admission standards to the facts of a particular bar admission application. 0
These cases were not the end, because the Court's attitude was
later reflected in In re Patterson,"' when the case was remanded
for reconsideration by the state in light of the Konigsbergand Schware
cases. Also, in In re Sawyer,32 another local court's determination
was reversed by the Supreme Court upon grounds that the Court
did not believe the record was sufficient to support a finding that the
attorney's speech out of the courtroom during progress of the trial
impunged integrity of the presiding judge or reflected upon his impartiality and fairness in presiding at the trial. Thus, another twist
of the vise was placed on the states' freedom to control their bars.
Nevertheless, this new situation was to continue only for approximately four years. In April 1961, the Supreme Court loosened
the vice and practically restored the states' control over their bars
by giving them a way around the Konigsberg and Schware decisions.
The four cases, Cohen v. Hurley," In re Anastaplo, 4 Konigsberg
35 and Lathrop v. Donohue,36 virtually
v. State Bar of California
causes a return to the status quo.
Two of the cases, In re Anastaplo 37 and Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California,8 are the most prominent in manifesting a change
in the Court's position since they deal with bar admissions, the
area in which the Court had seemingly broken tradition.
In In re Anastaplo, the Court held that the state's interest in
enforcing a rule precluding an applicant's admission to practice law
if he obstructs the bar examining committee by refusing to answer
2

In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1944).
29
Comment, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 415 (1958).
3
1 Comment, 106 U. PA. L. Rv. 753 (1958).
31 353 U.S. 952 (1957).

360 U.S. 622 (1959).
366 U.S. 117 (1961).
34 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
35 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
36 81 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1961).
37 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
38 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
32
33
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material questions regarding Communist party membership outweighs
any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association and
does not offend the fourteenth amendment. Further, the Court
held in the 1961 Konigsberg case that the protection of the fourteenth amendment against arbitrary state action does not forbid
the state from denying bar admission to an applicant so long as
he refuses to provide unprivileged answers to questions as to Communist party affiliation having substantial relevance to his qualifications.
These two decisions will enable the states to avoid the 1957
Konigsberg and Schware rulings and still accomplish their desired
control over bar admissions and discipline. The difference lies in
the fact that, if a bar applicant refuses to answer questions reaching
into the first and fourteenth amendments, the bar committee, although it cannot infer bad moral character from the refusal, merely
needs to base its position of denying the application on the ground
that the applicant's behavior has obstructed the bar committee in
performing its duties and thereby base its case on the proposition
that the state interest involved outweighs the individual's rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The other two 1961 decisions, Cohen v. Hurley 9 and Lathrop
v. Donohue," indicate that the Supreme Court has definitely decided to leave management of state bars to the states. In the Cohen
case, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not forbid
the state from making an attorney's refusal to answer questions at
an inquiry as to -the propriety of his professional conduct a per se
ground for disbarment and that such ground was not rendered unconstitutional when the refusal rested upon a bona fide claim of
a privilege against self-incrimination. So it would seem that neither
bar applicants nor bar members may remain silent during an inquisition.
The Lathrop case considered and sustained the constitutionality
of an integrated state bar, holding that an integrated bar did not
infringe upon an attorney's constitutionally protected freedom of
association. The decision reflects the traditional attitude of the Court
toward state control.

39 366 U.S. 117 (1961).

40 81 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1961).
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Thus it seems that while the Supreme Court did not hesitate
to give the due process clause a liberal interpretation which contravened the time-honored rights of the states as to the legal profession, yet the Court's respect and esteem for the praise-worthy
tradition allowed the tradition to remain intact. However, a petition
for certiorari has been granted for review by the Supreme Court
in the case of In re Zipkin," in which is presented the question
of whether a state's determination of a bar applicant's having bad
moral character because he attempted to influence testimony of a
witness connected with a state hearing on unprofessional conduct
charges against a psychiatrist is a violation of due process. After
a decision has been rendered in this case, it will be possible to
determine further whether the Court intends to leave the states
with total control over bar admissions and discipline, in line with
the traditional practice, or if the Court wishes to return to their
position of 1957. It has been suggested that the answer to the due
process problem could be solved by looking to settled usages in an
historical approach.42 If this method is ever used exclusively, then
the states should regain their autonomy in this area as this approach
will leave them entirely on their own.
Esdel Beane Yost

U.S.L. WEEK
1961) (No. 288).
DowLING,
op. cit.3101
supra(U.S.
note Oct.
25, at10,601.
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